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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE* 
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics 
based at Fordham University School of Law sponsors 
programs, develops publications, and supports 
scholarship on contemporary issues of law and 
ethics, and encourages professional and public 
institutions to integrate moral perspectives into 
their work.  The Stein Center collaborates with law 
students, practitioners, judges, and legal scholars to 
study and improve the legal profession with an 
emphasis on the ethical and professional values at 
the core of the practice of law.  As part of this 
mission, the Stein Center regularly cultivates 
scholarly inquiry and scholarship on the professional 
conduct and regulation of lawyers.  Over the past 
decade, the Stein Center and affiliated Fordham 
Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of 
the administration of criminal justice in the context 
of the professional obligations of prosecutors. 
Conflicts of interest in criminal prosecutions 
implicate serious professional ethics questions 
important to the Stein Center.  Prosecutors, in their 
pursuit of justice, owe a duty to the defendant and to 
the public to carry out each prosecution in a manner 
                                            
*   Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, the parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief.  Letters of consent 
have been filed with the Clerk.  No counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or 
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief.  No person other 
than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a 








that upholds the guarantees of the Constitution.  
This duty necessarily encompasses the right to a 
disinterested prosecutor, free from conflict, to avoid 
both the actual presence of and even the appearance 
of improper influence that would undermine public 
trust in the criminal justice system.  This interest is 
heightened when the prosecution determines to seek, 
and in fact obtains, a sentence of death. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The constitutional dimensions of the right to a 
disinterested prosecutor affect not only the 
individual defendants, but the criminal justice 
system as a whole.  The justice system in the United 
States depends upon the fair administration of 
justice, which incorporates a right to a disinterested 
prosecutor.  As a plurality of this Court observed in 
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 
481 U.S. 787 (1987), when an “interested party” acts 
as a prosecutor, the resulting error is “fundamental 
and pervasive.”  Id. at 809–10 (plurality opinion).  
The error undoubtedly infects the individual 
conviction in ways known, unknown, and 
unknowable.  And it casts doubt on the procedures in 
place to ensure due process under the law.  For this 
reason, as the same plurality determined in Vuitton, 
the involvement of a conflicted prosecutor “require[s] 
reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances 
of a particular case.”  Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
Such a rule is important not only to protect 
defendants, but to make clear the professional 
standards to which prosecutors must hold 








standards.  Following Vuitton, state and federal 
courts have struggled to determine the appropriate 
standard by which to assess whether the 
participation of an interested prosecutor gives rise to 
a conflict, whether such participation qualifies as a 
due process violation, and what the remedy should 
be.  Courts often attempt to examine the harm or 
prejudice caused in a certain prosecution.  But this 
standard—in addition to not addressing the damage 
caused to the integrity of the judicial system—also 
leaves prosecutors unable to determine in real time 
whether they must recuse themselves and what the 
consequences of the participation will be. 
The petition and the decisions below exemplify 
the inadequacy of the current regime and the 
importance of a clear and  easily applied test of the 
due process interests at stake.  Sue Korioth worked 
alongside both the Kaufman County District 
Attorney Michael McLelland, of whose murder 
petitioner ultimately was convicted, and First 
Assistant DA Mark Hasse, in whose murder 
petitioner was implicated during the sentencing 
phase that resulted in a death sentence.  Pet. App. B 
at 13, 84.  Although Korioth recognized that neither 
she nor anyone else in her office should prosecute 
the crimes that had been committed against her co-
workers and McLelland’s wife, Cynthia—indeed, 
Korioth drafted the recusal motions that the trial 
court granted in both instances—she nonetheless 
participated in both the investigation and the 
prosecution.  Id. at 85–86, 88.  Korioth advised, 
researched, discussed, drafted, and edited the 
materials, filings, and decisions underlying a 








conducting herself.  Id. at 88.  But because the 
evidence did not establish that her prohibited 
participation rose to a level of “control” that the 
court deemed sufficiently prejudicial, and because 
the court found no “actual conflict” ex post, despite 
Korioth’s own decision to recuse herself ex ante, 
petitioner was denied relief.  Id. at 110–13.    
As this case illustrates, it is effectively 
impossible to identify all the ways that a 
prosecutor’s conflicts can shape the course of an 
investigation, prosecution, and trial, and an attempt 
to determine whether such errors in the very 
underpinnings of the case were harmless achieves 
neither justice nor efficiency.  Clarifying that the 
involvement of a conflicted prosecutor violates due 
process and results in structural error will 
encourage and empower prosecutors to meaningfully 
identify and act on their ethical obligations.  It will 
provide courts with a workable test when evaluating 
allegations that prosecutors have failed to do so.  
And it will instill broader confidence that those 
tasked with carrying out the public’s interest in 
criminal justice are doing so without disfavor or 
personal interest. 










I. THE INVOLVEMENT OF A CONFLICTED 
PROSECUTOR IS A DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATION AND CONSTITUTES 
STRUCTURAL ERROR  
The Court should hold that a conflicted 
prosecutor’s involvement in a prosecution, per se, 
requires reversal because it violates a defendant’s 
due process rights and constitutes structural error. 
A. The Due Process Clause Affords A 
Criminal Defendant The Right To A 
Disinterested Prosecutor 
At the heart of the analysis of the right to a trial 
by a disinterested prosecution lies the Constitution.  
As Justice Blackmun stated decades ago, “the 
practice—federal or state—of appointing an 
interested party’s counsel to prosecute for criminal 
contempt is a violation of due process.”  Vuitton, 481 
U.S. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  The 
Constitution “requires a disinterested prosecutor 
with the unique responsibility to serve the public, 
rather than a private client, and to seek justice that 
is unfettered.”  Id. at 815. 
The Vuitton case concerned a criminal contempt 
prosecution undertaken by attorneys representing a 
party in the underlying litigation.  Id. at 792 
(majority opinion).  The Court held, in a seven-vote 
majority opinion, that the appointment of such an 
interested prosecutor was error.  Id. at 809.  A four-
vote plurality of the Court also concluded that this 
error was structural, and required automatic 








opinions of the Court—both the majority and the 
plurality—expressly based their conclusions on the 
Court’s supervisory authority, and did not reach 
whether the conflict of interest that the Court had 
found intolerable also violated the defendant’s due 
process rights.  See id. at 809 (majority opinion).  
Only Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, 
would have reached the constitutional issue and held 
the disinterested prosecutor’s participation violated 
due process.  Id. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning is nonetheless in 
line with the Court’s historical approach to 
identifying the process that criminal defendants are 
due under the Constitution.  The right to a fair trial 
encompassed in the due process clauses affords 
criminal defendants a panoply of rights not 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.  These 
rights include, inter alia, the right to an unbiased 
judge, Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 
(1971), to a presumption of innocence, Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976), to have the 
government prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970), and 
to obtain exculpatory evidence in the government’s 
possession, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process,” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955), and so “[f]airness of course requires an 
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases,” id.  As a 
result, “our system of law has always endeavored to 
prevent even the probability of unfairness.”  Id.   
In this vein, the Court previously has recognized 








financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process 
may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into 
the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise 
serious constitutional questions.”  Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980); see also 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is 
as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one.”). 
Consistent with this Court’s due process 
jurisprudence and with Justice Blackmun’s 
concurring opinion in Vuitton, numerous lower 
courts have recognized that the right to a 
disinterested prosecutor does indeed have a 
constitutional dimension.  For example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that 
prosecution by a prosecutor with impermissibly 
conflicted interests “violates the requirement of 
fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Ganger v. 
Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).  Other 
courts have identified varying degrees of due process 
protection against trial by a conflicted prosecutor.  
See, e.g., United States ex rel. SEC v. Carter, 907 
F.2d 484, 486 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 681 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Faulkner v. State, 260 P.3d 430, 431 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 2011); In re Goodman, 210 S.W.3d 805, 808 
(Tex. App. 2006); Lux v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 
145, 149 (Va. App. 1997); State v. Eldridge, 951 








Hunter, 313 S.C. 53, 54 (S.C. 1993); Cantrell v. 
Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985). 
These lower court decisions, like Justice 
Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Vuitton, correctly 
recognize that criminal prosecution by an attorney 
with a conflict of interest implicates a criminal 
defendant’s right to due process.  The petition 
provides an opportunity for this Court to do the 
same. 
B. The Involvement Of A Conflicted 
Prosecutor Is Structural Error  
The plurality in Vuitton observed that when an 
“interested party” acts as a prosecutor, the resulting 
error is “so fundamental and pervasive that [it] 
require[s] reversal without regard to the facts or 
circumstances of a particular case.”  481 U.S. at 809–
10 (plurality opinion) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
at 681).  The plurality’s conclusion that the error 
was not subject to harmless error review but instead 
required reversal in every instance is of a piece with 
the Court’s subsequent structural error 
jurisprudence. 
In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 
(2017), the Court identified “at least three broad 
rationales” for exempting an error from harmless 
error review:  (1) “when the error’s effects are simply 
too hard to measure,” (2) when “the right at issue is 
not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous 
conviction but instead protects some other interest,” 
and (3) when “the error always results in 
fundamental unfairness.”  Id. at 1908.  All three 
considerations militate in favor of a structural-error 








Difficulty of measurement.  There is no 
reliable method of measuring how the interests and 
biases that a conflicted prosecutor brings to a 
prosecution affect subsequent decision-making, 
either by that prosecutor individually or by a 
broader team.  Prosecutorial communication and 
decision-making happen off the record, outside the 
view of the court.  Accordingly, it is effectively 
entirely obscured from later judicial review.  See, 
e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) 
(“[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited 
to judicial review.”); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca 
Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 
58 B.C. L. Rev. 463, 491 (2017) (noting that “actual 
prejudice” in the case of a conflicted prosecutor is 
“nearly impossible to show, given that there is no 
discovery of prosecutors’ internal decision-making 
and, in any event, prosecutors themselves may be 
unaware of the cognitive impact of a conflict”).   
In Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 
(2016), a case involving an analogously difficult-to-
measure potential for bias, the Court held that the 
mere participation of one conflicted judge on a three-
judge panel constituted structural error requiring 
reversal in every instance.  Id. at 1909–10.  The 
Court reasoned that, “while the influence of any 
single participant in [the judicial] process can never 
be measured with precision, experience teaches us 
that each member’s involvement plays a part in 
shaping the court’s ultimate disposition.”  Id. at 1909 
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 
831 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  So too may 
the involvement of a conflicted prosecutor “shape” 








the decision to indict, whether to offer a plea,  how to 
conduct the trial, and what penalties to seek.  See 
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion:  The 
Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 Dick. 
L. Rev. 589, 595–601 (2019) (discussing the 
enormous impact that prosecutors’ exercise of 
discretion has on a prosecution).  As a result, a 
“[h]armless-error analysis in such a context would be 
a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred 
in an alternate universe.”  United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).  Because a 
conflicted prosecution can create harm yet evade a 
harmless error review, it is properly treated as a 
structural error.   
Interests beyond a reliable outcome.  The 
public has an interest in appointed or elected 
prosecutors doing the public’s work without 
improper consideration of personal interests.  The 
presence of a conflict does not just call into doubt the 
standing of one prosecutor in a single case, but can 
work to undermine public faith in the criminal 
justice system, much like the participation of a 
biased judge.  See Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909 
(“[T]he appearance of bias demeans the reputation 
and integrity not just of one jurist, but of the large 
institution of which her or she is a part.”).  As the 
Vuitton plurality recognized, the participation of a 
conflicted prosecutor raises doubts that “undermine[] 
confidence in the integrity of the criminal 
proceeding,” and “‘calls into question the objectivity 
of those charged with bringing a defendant to 
judgment.’”  481 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 








prosecutor undermines the public’s trust in the 
judicial system and the public’s interest in a just 
outcome. 
Fundamental unfairness.  Finally, it is 
fundamentally unfair to a defendant to have to 
contend with the awesome power of the state’s 
prosecuting authority if that office is dedicated not 
only to doing justice but to achieving a particular 
outcome with respect to that particular defendant, 
even if the interests of justice would dictate a 
different outcome.  Trial by a conflicted judge is 
fundamentally unfair and not amenable to harmless 
error analysis, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 
(1927), as are other “structural defects in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy 
analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).  Like those 
errors in the basic architecture by which a defendant 
is charged, tried, and convicted, and unlike errors 
which occur “during the presentation of the case to 
the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence presented,” 
id. at 307–08, the involvement of a conflicted 
prosecutor calls the entire proceeding into question 
and does not lend itself to an appellate 
determination of how a prosecution by an unbiased 
prosecutor would have differed, as is necessary to 
deem a constitutional violation harmless. 
Each of the bases for finding structural error are 
present in this case, as in other cases in which 
prosecutors have conflicts of interest.  A criminal 
prosecutor “is not disinterested if he has . . . an axe 
to grind against the defendant, as distinguished 








society have in bringing a defendant to justice with 
respect to the crime with which he is charged.”  
Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 
1984) (Friendly, J.).  By recusing herself and her 
office from prosecuting petitioner but nonetheless 
playing an extensive behind-the-scenes role in 
petitioner’s arrest, conviction, and death sentence, 
Korioth applied that principle in word, but not in 
deed.  The extent of Korioth’s influence on the 
innumerable discretionary and strategic choices that 
occur in a prosecution for capital murder are 
unknown and unknowable, and the lower courts’ 
attempt to re-weigh the animus she had recognized 
merited disqualification and to measure the extent 
she brought that conflict to bear on such decisions 
was unsurprisingly fruitless.  Korioth’s bias and the 
resulting impact on petitioner’s conviction and 
sentence were difficult to measure, at odds with the 
public’s interest in the neutral application of justice, 
and fundamentally unfair. 
II. A STRUCTURAL-ERROR RULE WOULD 
PROVIDE PROSECUTORS WITH THE 
MEANS TO AVOID A DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATION 
A clear statement that the involvement of a 
conflicted prosecutor amounts to a due process 
violation and qualifies as structural error not only 
would protect the integrity of the judicial system and 
the rights of individual defendants, but it also would 
be likely to lessen the occurrence of prosecutions 
tainted by conflict.  Lower courts have frequently 
conflated the analyses for judging a conflict, due 
process violation, and appropriate remedy when 








prosecutors.  Prosecutors are left with an amorphous 
test for assessing their own conduct and the 
consequences of it.   
 The articulation of a bright-line rule holding 
that an improperly conflicted prosecutor’s 
involvement requires reversal in every instance 
would resolve a lack of uniformity in this area of law, 
and thereby encourage and empower prosecutors to 
avoid the participation of a conflicted prosecutor. 
A. The Different Standards For Assessing 
The Nature Of And Remedy For A 
Prosecutor Conflict Fail To Provide 
Prosecutors With Clear Guidance 
Necessary To Comply With Their 
Ethical Obligations 
As discussed, supra Part I.B, the plurality 
opinion in Vuitton “establish[ed] a categorical rule 
against the appointment of an interested prosecutor, 
adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of 
judgment.”  481 U.S. at 814 (plurality opinion).  
However, given the lack of a majority opinion or 
subsequent guidance from the Court on this point, 
few lower courts have similarly concluded that 
“reversal is automatic if conflict is found.”  United 
States v. Lanier, 879 F.3d 141, 151 (5th Cir. 2018); 
see, e.g., Faulkner, 260 P.3d at 433 (rejecting 
argument that defendant had to show actual harm 
from involvement of conflicted prosecutor); 
Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d 700, 702 (Pa. 
1992) (“We hold that a prosecution is barred when 
an actual conflict of interest affecting the prosecutor 
exists in the case; under such circumstances a 








require that the conflict be removed.”); see also 
Sinclair v. State, 363 A.2d 468, 475 (Md. 1976) (pre-
Vuitton decision requiring automatic reversal of 
conviction based on impermissible prosecutorial 
conflict). 
Other courts have disregarded the plurality’s 
rule in Vuitton and instead have required 
defendants who challenge the disinterestedness of 
their prosecutors to “prove actual prejudice” on 
appeal.  Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1277; see, e.g., United 
States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 460 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(defendants must “establish[] that they were 
prejudiced by any conflict of interest” to obtain 
relief); United States v. Kahre, 737 F.3d 554, 574 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“[D]efendants must demonstrate 
prejudice from the prosecutor’s potential conflict of 
interest.”); Webber v. Scott, 390 F.3d 1169, 1176–77 
(10th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error analysis); 
United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App’x 770, 771 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (requiring prejudice); Pabst v. State, 192 
P.3d 630, 639–40 (Kan. 2008) (requiring prejudice 
under state law); People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199, 
213 (Cal. 2006) (requiring prejudice to reverse 
conviction obtained by prosecutor who should have 
recused under state law). 
Nor do lower courts all agree on the allocation of 
the burden, even when they otherwise agree that 
prosecution by a conflicted prosecutor can potentially 
be excused as harmless.  The Fourth Circuit, in a 
frequently cited decision, applied harmless error 
analysis but placed the burden on the government to 
prove the due process violation was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Ganger, 379 F.2d at 714–15.  








New York has reasoned that “the practical 
impossibility of establishing that the conflict has 
worked to defendant’s disadvantage dictates the 
adoption of standards under which a reasonable 
potential for prejudice will suffice.”  People v. 
Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980); see also 
Spiker, 649 F. App’x at 774 (finding plain error and 
reversing conviction obtained by interested 
prosecutor due to “the far-reaching effect” of the 
prosecutor’s choices and because the conflict 
“seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of a judicial proceeding”). 
This inconsistent review for prejudice obscures 
more than it illuminates.  Courts routinely fail to 
distinguish clearly between their analyses of 
whether a particular prosecutor had an 
impermissible conflict of interest, whether an 
impermissibly conflicted prosecutor was sufficiently 
involved in a prosecution to call it into question, and 
whether a defendant was ultimately prejudiced.  
Compare, e.g., In re Jackson, 51 A.3d 529, 539 n.13 
(D.C. 2012) (“The prosecutor is not disinterested if 
he or she ‘has a special motivation to favor the 
victim or satisfy a victim’s private agenda if that 
agenda is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s public 
duty to serve all the people neutrally, i.e., equally 
and fairly.’”) (quoting Bennett L. Gershman, 
Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights:  The 
Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 559, 563 (2005)), with, e.g., Person v. Miller, 854 
F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding no reversible 
error where undisputedly interested party’s attorney 
participated in prosecution because “[t]here [was] no 








not exercise an independent prosecutorial 
judgment”). 
The decision below recognized and indeed 
exemplifies the lack of clarity in the relevant law.  
The trial court’s Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law relied on secondary authority for 
the proposition that Vuitton “did not settle the issue 
of whether a prosecutor’s lack of disinterestedness 
can constitute a per se violation of due process or 
whether disinterestedness is subject to harmless 
error analysis.”  Pet. App. B at 111 (quoting Edward 
L. Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in Texas Criminal 
Cases, 54 Baylor L. Rev. 171, 187 (2002)).  And the 
ensuing analysis conflated prosecutor Korioth’s 
conflict of interest, Korioth’s involvement in 
petitioner’s prosecution, and whether petitioner was 
prejudiced.  In assessing whether Korioth was a 
“decision maker,” the court observed that “the 
evidence of [petitioner’s] guilt is strong,” which is 
relevant to prejudice.  Id. at 94.  In assessing 
whether Korioth had an actual conflict of interest 
due to her friendship with a victim, the court 
observed that petitioner “fail[ed] to prove Korioth 
committed misconduct towards [petitioner’s] 
prosecution based on her friendship,” which is 
relevant to her involvement.  Id. at 104.  And in 
assessing whether petitioner was prejudiced, the 
court observed that he “was tried by an impartial 
judge and jury, he was represented by counsel, and 
he had a full opportunity to present his case,” none 









B. Barring Participation By Conflicted 
Prosecutors Gives Prosecutors Clear 
Tools To Analyze And Comply With 
Their Ethical Obligations 
Given these muddled and divergent standards 
for evaluating impermissible prosecutorial conflicts, 
prosecutors are left to engage in a guessing game as 
to their ethical obligations in any given case.  Unlike 
private attorneys, prosecutors cannot defer to a 
client to assess or waive conflicts of interest.  Green 
& Roiphe, supra, at 505.  Prosecutors themselves are 
often the only and final arbiters of whether or not to 
recuse, and may fail to consider the effect that their 
involvement or presence may have on discretionary 
decisions in the case.  Id. at 505–06.  The importance 
of self-regulation among prosecutors is only 
heightened by their historical hostility and 
resistance to professional regulation by external 
bodies such as bar associations.  See Bruce A. Green, 
Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 873, 875–82 (2012). 
A standard that looks uniquely to the existence 
of a conflict gives prosecutors a clear, bright-line rule 
at the outset of a prosecution to determine whether 
they may be involved.  Not only does it take a much 
needed zero-tolerance policy regarding the potential 
for impermissible influence, but it also operates to 
ensure public confidence in the system by focusing 
on the knowable potential for impropriety, rather 
than the unknowable, case-by-case inquiry of actual 
prejudice.  Green & Roiphe, supra, at 491. 
Conversely, an involvement- or prejudice-based 








reevaluate the sliding scale of the seriousness of the 
conflict and the degree of their involvement 
throughout the litigation.  It also requires 
prosecutors to account for biases and influence that 
they themselves may not even be aware of.  See id.  
Moreover, because prosecutors’ offices do not 
typically record their deliberative processes in detail, 
requiring a defendant to demonstrate actual 
prejudice imposes a near-impossible task unless the 
degree of the conflict is so significant that there can 
be no doubt as to its effect.  If such a standard were 
applied, it would discourage prosecutors with serious 
but less blatant conflicts from recusing themselves, 
knowing that a defendant will be unable to satisfy 
the ultimate burden of demonstrating harm. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant the petition for 
certiorari and summarily reverse the decision of the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. 
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